USA v. Emil Faison by unknown
2018 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-1-2018 
USA v. Emil Faison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Emil Faison" (2018). 2018 Decisions. 94. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2018/94 
This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2018 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1559 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
           
 v. 
  
EMIL FAISON 
Appellant 
______________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cr-00469-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 17, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  February 1, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Emil Faison appeals as substantively unreasonable the judgment of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentencing him to 120 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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months’ imprisonment, which reflects a downward variance from the bottom of the 
sentencing range prescribed by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We will affirm. 
I 
 As we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we set out only the facts necessary 
for the discussion that follows. Faison pled guilty to ten counts of distribution and aiding 
and abetting distribution of oxycodone, for his participation in a large-scale drug 
trafficking operation led by Leon Little. Little recruited and paid individuals to become 
legitimate patients of a Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania doctor in order to procure 
prescriptions of oxycodone and other controlled substances. Little arranged for the 
transportation of these individuals to the doctor’s office and then to multiple local 
pharmacies. Little then arranged for the resale of the drugs obtained from the filled 
prescriptions.  
 Faison participated in the operation as a pseudo-patient for Little and two of 
Little’s co-conspirators. Pharmacy records established that Faison filled nineteen 
controlled substance prescriptions during ten trips to Philly Pharmacy from November 
2011 to June 2012, which included approximately 2,150 tablets of oxycodone.  
Faison’s guideline range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment, based on a 
criminal history category of VI and a total offense level of 31. In determining his 
sentence, the District Court considered Faison’s role in Little’s operation as well as his 
criminal history, which included two prior convictions for drug offenses. The court also 
considered mitigating factors, which included Faison’s significant substance abuse 
history and a personal background that rendered him vulnerable to exploitation by an 
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individual like Little. The District Court then applied a five-level downward variance and 
imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 120 months. Faison appeals on the ground that 
his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the shorter sentences imposed on 
other defendants charged in the Little operation. 
II1 
We review the substantive unreasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). As the party challenging the sentence, 
Faison bears the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness. United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Review for substantive reasonableness requires a 
“totality of the circumstances” approach, pursuant to which we accord significant 
deference to a district court’s “determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, 
justify the sentence.” Id. at 567–68 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, “we 
will affirm [a sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 
same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Id. 
at 568. 
Although 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) directs the Sentencing Court to consider “the 
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records 
who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” the courts have recognized that 
cooperation is a circumstance that justifies a disparate sentence. United States v. Parker, 
462 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2006). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that he 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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is similarly situated to other defendants “in terms of the extent of the crime, charges, 
prior history, and jurisdiction.” United States v. Robinson, 603 F.3d 230, 234–35 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
Here, Faison is unable to establish that he is similarly situated to defendants in 
related cases who received lighter sentences. Unlike the individuals he identifies in his 
brief who cooperated, Faison did not substantially assist the Government in the 
investigation or prosecution of others. Accordingly, Faison was not similarly situated to 
the cooperating individuals that he identifies, nor does his sentence warrant the same 
reduction that those individuals received. 
The District Court engaged in a careful and thoughtful analysis of the § 3553(a) 
factors and properly concluded that while Faison’s prior drug offenses coupled with his 
participation in the present offense demonstrated a troubling escalation in criminal 
activity, they did not warrant a sentence within the guideline range. The District Court 
then granted Faison a 68-month downward variance. Because we cannot say that “no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on [Faison] for the 
reasons the [D]istrict [C]ourt provided,” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568, we conclude that the 
sentence was substantively reasonable.  
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.  
